The Active Network Design Space

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Outline: the Design Space

- Usability *vs.* Flexibility *vs.* Security *vs.* Performance
- There may be unattractive tradeoffs, e.g., Performance and Security may be inversely related! (also Usability?)
- Usability and Flexibility can (mostly) be obtained with a general-purpose language such as Java, Caml or Forth

Active Network Architecture



Example: SwitchWare Architecture



The ALIEN Approach

- Achieved by *restricting* a general computing model
- Realized in ALIEN, an active loader for Caml
  - → General computing model
  - → Interface to OS
  - → Interface to active code
- Only privileged portions of the system can directly access shared resources

Decisions in the Design Space

- Usability *vs.* Flexibility *vs.* Security *vs.* Performance
- A General-Purpose Language gets the first two for free; other two are hard!
- Domain-specific Languages (such as PLAN) may achieve different tradeoffs

The ALIEN Active Loader

- D. Scott Alexander
- CAML runtime
- CAML capsules restricted via module thinning
- Digitally-signed certificates for remote accesses to resources
- Will use for detailed case study

ALIEN in an Active Element

- Three layer architecture



Implementation of Active Code

- Active Extensions
  - → Loaded from disk or network (TFTP)
  - → We use queues for communication
  - → Could use upcalls...
    - ✦ Security?
  - → ...or blocking downcalls
- Active Packets
  - → ANEP encapsulated (over UDP or link layer)
  - → Can use SANE for security
  - → Linker/ procedure call for communications

Active Packets in ALIEN

- If ANEP header indicates ALIEN
  - → SANE processing as part of ANEP
  - → Code portion is loaded
  - → *func* is called with code, data, and func name as arguments



saneping Performance



Overall Breakdown of Costs



Major Costs

- Kernel/Wire (26%, 3078 μs)
  - → Kernel time + transmission time
  - → To avoid
    - ✦ Reduce size of packet
    - ✦ Reduce or avoid kernel boundary crossing cost
- Authentication (25%, 2910 μs)
  - → Mostly cost of performing SHA-1 (4 times)

Cryptography is Expensive

- Implemented in C because too slow in Caml
- Times to hash 4MB of data

	bytecode	native
Caml Int32	86.45s	61.99s
Caml int	36.03s	2.48s
C		0.33s

The take-home lesson:

- Must reduce per-packet crypto costs:
  - → Active extension amortizes costs
  - → ANTS caching amortizes costs
  - → Smaller packets (Dense CISC, a la BBN)
- Or, find another way to avoid crypto in the common case…

Packet Language for Active Networks (PLAN)

- Hicks, Kakkar, Moore, Gunter, Nettles
- Capsule-based approach
- CAML runtime
- Highly-restricted domain specific language (a safe "glue" language, like the UNIX shell), extensible via ALIEN
- Active extensions do restricted things

The Programmable Protocol Processing Pipeline (P4)



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The P4 illustrates

- A restricted programming environment
  - → Field-programmable gate arrays
- Very high performance; operates at OC-3c line rate with a 19.44Mhz clock
- Easily reaches to 300-400 Mbps with increases in clock rate and word size
- Can be integrated with software EE
  - → A high-performance active HW/SW *hybrid*

Some Performance Tradeoffs



Activation potential at various current line rates:



Next Generation: in-Fiber A.N.



Register-Only Media Processor (ROMP)

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