

# A Secure PLAN (extended version)

Michael Hicks, Cornell University

Angelos D. Keromytis, Columbia University


Jonathan M. Smith, U. Penn

DARPA Active Networks Conference and Exposition  
(DANCE), San Francisco CA, May 29-30, 2002

# Nugget to take home:

- A careful separation between language protections for active packets and cryptography-based authorizations for active extensions can lead to a system with flexibility, performance *and* security
- <http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~switchware/PLAN>

# PLANet: 2-level Architecture




PLAN :

- safe
- in packet


Services:

- general
- on router

# Trust Management




# Trust Management




not  
allowed

# Form of Service Policies: Access




default user

# Form of Service Policies: Access




privileged user

# Form of Service Policies: Usage






# Form of Service Policies: Usage




# Security Procedure




arrival  
as default user

# Security Procedure




authentication

# Security Procedure



namespace  
adjustment

# Security Procedure



# Security Mechanisms

## □ Authentication via HMAC-SHA1

→ signed Diffie-Hellman, as with IPsec

## □ Authorization Policies - Query Certificate Manager (QCM)

→ language based on sets

→ set descriptions may be distributed

→ Use of certificates for push-based policy

# Chunks - units of authentication

- Unit of evaluation in PLAN

  - like a suspended function call


- First-class

  - can be manipulated as data within PLAN programs

- Useful programming construct


  - encapsulation via `eval`

# Chunks - in PLAN packets





# Ping packet



# Core Service

```
authEval: 'a chunk * sign -> 'a
```


- takes a chunk and an HMAC digital signature and authenticates the chunk
  - if successful, performs namespace adjustment and evaluates the chunk

# Application: An Active Firewall


- Rather than *filter* external packets, *restrict their privilege*
- Accomplished by encapsulating incoming packets with service-restricting chunk

```
fun wrap(c, sign) =  
    (zeroRB(); authEval(c, sign))
```


# Experimental Setup



# Outgoing Ping




# Returning Acknowledgement




*Firewall signs as and encapsulates packet chunk*

# Firewall-wrapped Ping packet




# Firewall Performance





# Firewall Overhead Breakdown



# Related Work

## □ AN Security

→ Security Architecture for AN

→ SANE

→ SQoSH/RCANE

## □ Language-based protection schemes

→ SPIN (Modula-3), MMM (Caml), J-kernel (Java),  
PCC and TAL (x86, Alpha assembly)

## □ Trust Management

→ Keynote, PolicyMaker

# Conclusions

- Security in AN: PLANet
  - while preserving performance, flexibility and usability
- Achieved with 2-level architecture
  - language safety in the packets
  - trust management for services
- Useful
  - active firewall (active encapsulation)


# Acknowledgments

- DARPA (of course!)
- Scott Nettles, Jonathan Moore, Scott Alexander, Bill Arbaugh, Trevor Jim, other SwitchWare team members
- An earlier (and highly abbreviated) version of this paper was presented at IWAN99 in Berlin, July 1999

# Questions and Discussion



# SwitchWare System Architecture



# ALIEN Active Loader

□ D. Scott Alexander's Ph.D. thesis

